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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS  
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Empirical findings on the negative association between women’s political 
representation and corruption are mixed and there is no consensus on why such 
association exists. Some argue that women’s risk aversion characteristic leads female 
legislators to engage in corruption less to avoid the risks of being caught. Others suggest 
that female legislators actively mobile against corruption to protect women’s interests. 
Using the panel data for up to 162 countries from 2002-2015, I first find that after 
controlling for the time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity, women’s political 
representation is negatively associated with corruption. Then, using mediation analysis, I 
find that social spending mediates the suppressing effect of women’s political 
representation and corruption, thus provide evidence for the women’s interest 
mechanism.  
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I. Introduction  
Despite numerous government efforts, corruption remains an important issue in 
both developed and developing countries. Studies document its negative consequences 
for economic and social development. For example, corruption inhibits economic growth 
(Mo 2001), threatens democracy (TI 2018), leads to greater income inequality and 
poverty (Gupta et al.2002), and reduces generalized social trust (Richey 2009). To 
understand the causes of corruption, a gender perspective is introduced by Swamy et al. 
(2001) and Dollar et al. (2001). Both studies find a negative association between 
women’s political representation (women’s presence in parliament) and corruption.  
Research findings on women’s political representation and corruption have varied 
and there are still no consensus about the causal relationship. While many researchers 
find evidence that countries with more women involved in parliament are less prone to 
corruption (Jha and Sarangi 2018; Watson and Moreland 2014; Treisman 2007), some 
find the relationship to be spurious and argue that liberal democratic institutions are the 
underlying causes for both women’s high political participation and lower corruption 
(Sung 2003; 2012). Also, some scholars find the association between women’s political 
representation and corruption is conditional on democratic institutions (Esarey and 
Chirillo 2013) and electoral accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). 
Nevertheless, these studies often rely on cross-country data but do not take the presence 
of time-invariant unobservable country-specific heterogeneity into consideration, which 
may lead to the biased results.  
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Further, the causal mechanisms about how women’s political representation 
reduces corruption are unclear. The most dominant explanation adopts a “gender 
difference approach”, suggesting that women’s essentialized characteristics such as risk-
aversion, lead women to engage in corruption less often than men because female 
politicians are more risk averse than males (Swamy et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; 
Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017; Barnes and Beaulieu 2018). However, this “gender 
difference approach” seems problematic in some ways. One, it may overemphasize risk 
aversion as the driver of differences in behavior. Other studies show that elite women 
may have similar risk-taking tendencies as men (Djerf-Pierre and Wängnerud 2015) and 
there can also be large risks involved in anti-corruption efforts. Further, this approach 
overlooks women’s conscientious political agency and female legislators’ broader effects 
in society, which may help reduce corruption. Another explanation about the relation 
between women’s political representation and corruption is the “women’s interest 
mechanism” (Alexander and Ravilik 2015). This argues that the effect of women’s 
political representation on corruption is due to female legislators’ different policy agenda 
compared to males. A female legislator’s policy preferences that aims to protect women’s 
interests may help reduce corruption (Bauhr, Charron and Wangnerud 2018; Jha and 
Sarangi 2018). This explanation is not empirically examined at the country level, and 
previous research has not disentangled the two causal mechanisms—gender difference 
approach and women’s interest approach.  
Based on a fixed-effects panel regression model and data for up to 162 countries 
from 2000 to 2015, I first examine whether there is an association between women’s 
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political representation and corruption. The results show that women’s political 
representation is significantly negatively associated with corruption, accounting for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. Secondly, using mediation 
analysis, I directly test the women’s interest causal mechanism. I find that the association 
between women’s political representation and corruption works via the expansion of 
social spending (government health spending). Moreover, the results are robust to models 
that address the potential for endogeneity in the relationship between health spending and 
corruption. These results suggest that female legislators’ political power, i.e. their policy 
agenda, and not essentialized risk aversion characteristics, lead to the reduced corruption.  
Empirically, my results suggest that women’s political representation have an 
effect on corruption. However, incorporating more women in parliaments is just the first 
step. Instead of relying on women’ naturalized or socialized essentialized characteristics, 
such as risk aversion to reduce corruption, more efforts should be paid to create a more 
women-friendly institutional and organizational environment which can help strengthen 
female legislators’ political power to achieve their policy agendas.  
II. Theoretical Framework  
Does Women’s Political Representation Reduce Corruption?  
Two pioneering studies identify the relationship between women’s political 
participation and corruption. Both link a negative effect of women’s political 
participation on corruption to the purported greater degrees of honesty, lower degrees of 
opportunism or risk aversion among women. With cross-country comparative data, 
Dollar, Fishman and Gatti (2001) find that higher rates of female participation in 
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government are associated with lower levels of corruption. Meanwhile, Swamy et al. 
(2001) examine both micro data and cross-country data and find similar results: 
corruption is lower in countries where women have greater representation in national 
parliaments and more participation in national labor markets. At the individual level, they 
find that women are less likely to condone and participate in corruption.  
Building on these two seminal studies, some find additional empirical support for 
the association between women’s political representation and corruption (e.g. Jha and 
Sarangi 2018; Watson and Moreland 2014; Treisman 2007). However, others fail to 
observe this relationship. Sung (2003;2012) rejects the “fair gender” thesis that women 
are less likely to engage in corruption. Instead, he proposes the “fairer system” thesis that 
liberal democratic institutions simultaneously promote women’s participation in politics 
and reduce corruption. He shows that the association between women’s political 
representation and corruption loses significance once variables measuring liberal 
democracies, such as rule of law, political rights and freedom of press are controlled. 
Along with Sung, scholars find that the association between women’s political 
representation and corruption is conditional on political regime. For example, Esarey and 
Chirillo (2013) show that women’s political representation has an effect on corruption in 
democratic institutions but not in authoritarian regimes. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 
(2017) find that strong electoral accountability in democratic-leaning countries enhances 
the relationship between women’s presence in parliament and lower levels of corruption.  
Further, the results from cross-sectional studies may be biased in the presence of 
unobservable country-specific heterogeneity. Only one study employing fixed-effect 
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panel regression found that the association between the presence of females in national 
parliament and corruption is not significant when unobservable country-specific 
heterogeneity is controlled (Debski, Jetter, Mosle and Stadelmann 2018). This suggests a 
need for further investigation. 
Thus, the above studies show that it is still unclear whether the causal relationship 
between women’s political representation and corruption is spurious. In this study, I 
control for democratic institutions and the unobservable country-specific heterogeneities 
to better evaluate this relationship.  
Women’s political representation and corruption: gender essentialism or women’s 
interest? 
In addition to the mixed empirical support for the association between women’s 
political representation and corruption, the causal mechanisms behind the relationship 
remain unclear.  The primary explanation in the literature is the “gender difference” 
approach. This approach contends that gender-specific characteristics lead women to 
engage in corruption less than men. For example, women can be more prosocial and less 
selfish due to the social role as caregivers. This essential characteristic discourages 
women from corrupted political practices, which sacrifice the public interest for private 
gain (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al.2001).  
One more frequently deployed essential characteristic is risk-aversion (Esarey and 
Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017; Barnes and Beaulieu 2018). These 
researchers argue that women are more risk averse than men, causing women to not 
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engage in corruption in order to avoid the risk of being caught.1  Esarey and Chirillo 
(2013) argue that the stronger effect of women’s political participation in democracies is 
consistent with this view, insofar as democratic institutions increase the risks of 
corruption. Thus, they suggest that women’s risk-aversion has a greater discouraging 
effect in democratic countries (also see Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017; Barnes and 
Beaulieu 2018).  
While the risk-averse mechanism may be plausible, it has several limitations. 
First, gender difference in risk taking may overemphasize purportedly essential gender 
characteristics as the driver of different behavior. This essentialist approach perpetuates 
the universalizing gender stereotypes attached to women thus overlooks the diversity of 
women’s experiences and the contextuality of women’s behaviors. For example, the 
results gained from laboratory studies may fail to extend to elite women, such as female 
legislators. Elite women may not be more risk averse than men. Indeed, some research 
suggests elite women have very similar perceptions regarding future risks and threats as 
men (Djerf-Pierre and Wängnerud 2015). The female participants in these experiments 
may not be comparable to female politicians who are a special group (Kauder and 
Potrafke 2016). Additionally, other studies show that mobilizing against corruption also 
involves large risks by creating political enemies (Bauhr et al. 2018).  
                                                 
1 Experiments on the role of gender in risk-taking show a more consistent gender 
gap where women, on average, take fewer risks than men (Byrnes et al. 1999). However, 
the results of experiments focusing on gender and corruption are mixed. Chaudhuri (2012) 
gives an overview on the experimental findings on gender and corruption and shows that 
while some studies find that women are less corrupted than men, others show no gender 
differences.  
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Importantly, the risk aversion mechanism also views women as passive actors 
who are refrained from the risks related to corruption and confined by societal scripts. In 
other words, this approach overlooks the conscience political agency of women. Thus, a 
second approach views women as rational actors who behave in ways that benefit 
women’s interest (Bauhr et al. 2018; Jha and Sarangi 2018). This second approach 
contends that female legislators actively oppose or inhibit corruption to achieve their 
political and personal goals (Bauher et al. 2018). In line with studies focusing on 
women’s political empowerment and the greater representation of women’s interests, 
Alexander and Ravilik (2015) develop “the women’s interest mechanism.” They argue 
that female politicians’ support of policies which improve welfare for women citizens is 
especially dependent on a well-functioning state that is free of corruption so that 
government resources can be allocated to the public rather than used for private gain. 
Thus, female legislators’ women-friendly policies provide incentives for women to 
pursue greater transparency of the state, which can help reduce the corruption (Alexander 
and Ravlik 2015; Jha and Sarangi 2018).  
Analyzing 140 countries worldwide from 1998-2011, Watson and Moreland 
(2014) show that both women’s political representation and women’s substantive 
representation (the degree of protection of women’s substantive interests) which is 
measured as government health expenditures and a policy on pregnancy protections 
reduce perceived corruption. Thus, they suggest that the perceived corruptions are lower 
in countries with more women-friendly policies. Bauher et al. (2018) conduct analyses on 
regional-level data in 20 European Union countries and find that women’s presence in 
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elected office decrease citizens’ corruption experience in public sector services such as 
education and health care which are issues prioritized more by women than men Also, the 
reduction in corruption is primarily experienced among women. Thus, they indicate that 
female legislators’ policy agenda aim to protect women’s interests by improving public 
service delivery helps reduce women’s need to engage in corruption and then leads to less 
corruption experienced by women.  
However, previous studies cannot disentangle the two types of mechanisms. It is 
unclear whether the reduction of corruption, even in certain areas like health care and 
education, identified as women-friendly areas, is due to women’s risk aversion or female 
politicians’ active effort to promote social policies which can be beneficial to women. In 
other words, the above studies do not examine the effects of the proposed causal 
mechanisms directly. Thus, the causal mechanism remains unclear and needs further 
exploration.  
Social policy and the effect of women’s political representation on corruption  
In this section, I introduce women’s policy preferences as a potentially mediating 
variable between women’s political power and corruption. I begin by reviewing previous 
research that establishes a clear relationship between women’s political representation 
and policy outputs.  Gender influences legislators’ attitudes and behaviors. Thus, female 
legislators prioritize issues and policies aiming to improve the welfare of women in 
society at large to a higher degree than males. In other words, they protect and represent 
women’s interests (Celis 2006; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Wangerud 2009). Studies 
have identified the gender dimension of social spending and have well illustrated that 
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women gain more benefits from welfare services than men, ensuring that most public 
welfare policies are “women friendly” (Hernes 1987; Borchorst and Siim 2002; Wilson 
2002). They argue it is due to women’s different life experiences and their structural 
position in the society (Allik 2016). Since women are major beneficiaries of social 
spending, female legislators who tend to represent women’s interests can function as an 
institution to channel women’s demands. A large literature finds that female legislators 
are more supportive of the expansion of social spending than men. (Bolzendahl and 
Brooks 2007; Caiazza 2004; Poggione 2004; Wangnerud 2000a). More specifically, they 
find that female legislators prioritize important welfare state issues such as education and 
health care which are two main area of “women’s interests” and they are more invested in 
social spending tied to these issues (Wängnerud 2009; Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007). 
While women’s political representation can possibly lead to more government 
investments in social spending, how does the enlarged social spending lead to a lower 
level of corruption? There are two possible explanations. First, increased social spending 
can decrease the need for both women and men to engage in corrupt transactions in the 
first place. For example, Bauhr et al. (2018) find that stronger political representation of 
women in local councils decreases petty corruption in education and health care.2 Also, 
Watson and Moreland (2014) suggest that passing laws about gender issues of protection 
                                                 
2 More specifically, they find that in the health care sector where the prevalence of petty 
corruption is the greatest in their sample, there is a substantive decrease in the possibility 
of paying a bribe for both women and men, but the effect is slightly stronger for women. 
With respect to education, the effect of female legislators on reducing corruption is much 
stronger for women than men. 
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of minority groups may have positive effects on citizens’ perceptions of the quality of 
government at large, leading to a lower perceived level of corruption.  
Second, theories of “state feminism” suggest that, by advancing women-friendly 
social policies, women’s political representation may increase favorable attitudes toward 
the state among women (Hernes 1987). Thus, women may promote greater government 
transparency, which in the long run may lower levels of corruption. When female 
legislators improve women’s substantive interests through expanding social spending, 
women in the larger society have more incentives to protect the state from corruption. For 
example, Stensöta et al. (2015B) find that more encompassing welfare states increase the 
propensity for women to vote against parties involved in corruption. Alexander (2018) 
finds that in countries with more social spending, females attribute higher importance to 
honest elections which are free from corruption. 
Given the strong empirical link from women’s political representation to social 
policy, I argue the latter is a mediating mechanism linking the former to corruption. In 
addition to the above, for example, Watson and Moreland (2014) observe that the effect 
of women’s political representation decreases after controlling for heath expenditures and 
pregnancy protection. Bauher et al. (2018) also suggest that women legislators’ policy 
agenda to improve public services delivery may help reduce corruption.  
III. Analytical Approach 
While my claim is consistent with extant explanations for the link from women’s 
representation to corruption and with evidence linking women’s representation to social 
policy, more direct evidence is needed to establish a mediating role for the latter. Thus, 
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based on the previous studies, I argue that the effect of women’s political representation 
on corruption works through increasing social spending, which is the result of female 
legislators’ preferred policies. To subject this argument to empirical scrutiny, I propose a 
direct mediation analysis to test the null hypothesis that women’s political representation 
has an indirect effect on corruption through its positive impact on social policy. This 
mediation analysis also helps to disentangle the two causal mechanisms--- risk aversion 
and women’s interest—described above.  
I measure social spending in two distinct ways. First, previous research identifies 
health care as an important women’s issue (Wängnerud 2009). Existing studies find 
connections between female politicians and their spending preferences tied to health-
promoting issues (Bratton and Ray 2002). Further, health care is the area which suffers 
from corruption severely. Based on the estimates from Transparency International (2011), 
at least 5 percent of the more than three trillion dollars spent yearly on health services 
worldwide may be lost to corruption.3 Bauher et al. (2018) also shows that in their sample 
which contains 85,000 respondents coming from 196 regions in 24 European countries, 
the prevalence of petty corruption is the greatest in the health care sector, compared to 
education and law enforcement. Thus, the first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Women’s stronger political representations reduce the levels of 
corruption through increased government health spending. 
                                                 
3 Article available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4666328.stm, accessed November 16, 
2011. 
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In addition to health care, education is widely identified by researchers as another 
area which fits with women’s interests and is also a major dimension of government’s 
social spending. Studies show that women prioritize education issues more than men 
(Clots-Figueras 2011; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Thus, the second hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2: Women’s stronger political representations reduce the levels of 
corruption through expanding government education spending. 
IV. Data and Methods 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is the level of corruption. It is measured by the corruption 
perception index (CPI), which is the most recognized measure of corruption (e.g. Swamy 
et al., 2001; Sung, 2003; Watson and Moreland, 2014). Transparency International 
produces an annual corruption ranking based on the perceived level of corruption in the 
public sector, including bribery, diversion of public funds, use of public office for private 
gain, nepotism in the civil service and state capture. This ranking is compiled by 
subjective assessments by expert and business executive (Diaz, Saisana, Montalto and 
Moura, 2018). It contains sources based on assessment of both foreigners and samples of 
nationals, which ensures the consistent perceptions of corruption across the world 
(Galtung 2006). The data is drawn from Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem 2018) 
which imported the corruption variable from Transparency International (2016) without 
any change. The index is continuous and ranges from 0 to 100, and higher scores indicate 
lower corruption levels. For a more convenient interpretation, I reverse the index so that 
higher scores indicate higher levels of corruption. More specifically, I generate a new 
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variable which equals the maximum value plus the minimum value, then minus the 
original value of corruption perception index (CPI=maximum value + minimum value – 
original values). The correlation between the new generated value and the original value 
is -1, which means only the direction of the variable changed.  
Compared to the objective, direct measures of corruption, the perception-based 
measurement of corruption has several advantages. First, objective criteria are hard to 
collect due to the secrecy of corrupted transactions and especially not available for cross-
country studies. Second, available objective data is often biased. The current objective 
measurement is commonly based on data on official criminal statistics. However, the 
legal definitions of corruption and the regulations about corruption can be different in 
each national context (Lambsdorff 2006). Thus, the perception of corruption is an 
appropriate measurement of corruption in the cross-country setting.  
 Independent variable  
The independent variable is women’s political representation (denoted WIP). It is 
measured as the percentage of seats held by women in the national parliaments. The 
yearly data is drawn from the Variety of Democracy dataset (V-Dem 2018), which 
complied related data from different sources, including Chronicle of Parliamentary 
Elections (IPU), Edgel (2014) and so on More specifically, I use the proportion of seats 
held by female in single or lower chambers of national parliament as the measurement of 
women’s political representation.  
The mediating variables capture two dimensions of social spending. The first is 
the domestic general government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, as a 
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measurement of government’s attention to the issue of health. The second is the 
government expenditure on education, as a percentage of GDP. These two measurements 
allow me to measure the social spending of developed countries as well as developing 
countries over time. Both data are drawn from World Bank (2018).  
Control variables  
Studies have shown other indicators of socioeconomic development are 
associated with corruption. For economic factors, studies have shown that economic 
development reduces corruption (e.g. Treisman 2000). Thus, I include GDP per capita in 
current international dollar as a control variable. In addition, corruption is found to be 
higher in countries where domestic firms are protected from foreign competition (Ades 
and Di Tella 1999). Thus, I control for foreign direct investment (net FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP) (e.g. Larraín 2004). Last, a control of inflation is included as higher 
inflation tend to result in more corruption (e.g. Braun, Miguel, and Rafael Di Tella 2000).  
In addition to economic variables, I also control political factors. First, the effects 
of different political systems are controlled by the level of democracy in a country. It is 
measured by the imputed version of polity score from Freedom House (2018). Hadenius 
and Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs better both in terms of validity 
and reliability than its original constituents parts. I draw the data from the database of 
Variety of Democracy (V-Dem 2018). The scale ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 is least 
democratic and 10 is most democratic. Second, it is argued that a powerful legal system 
which punishes the corruption behavior could decrease the incentives of corruption 
(Iwasaki and Suzuki 2012). Thus, I include the rule of law index as a control. It measures 
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the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society 
(Kaufmann et al. 2011). Further, voice and accountability is included since a strong 
accountability system will increase the risk of corruption being detected and punished by 
the public (e.g. Esarey and Schwindt-bayer 2017). It measures the extent to which 
citizens of a country can participate in the selection of governments and the independence 
of media (Kaufmann et al. 2011). Lastly, the regulatory quality is included since more 
regulations may give more discretionary power to the states, thus leading to more 
corruption (Dong and Torgler 2013). It reflects the perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. These three indexes are all taken directly from Varieties of 
Democracy dataset (V-Dem 2018) which collected these variables from World Bank 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2011). The variables range from approximately -
2.5(weak) to 2.5(strong).  
Further, culture also influences corruption. Scholars have argued that countries 
with more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Protestantism, have a lower 
corruption level than those with strong hierarchical religions (e.g. Machielsen 2016). 
Thus, the percentage of adherents of protestants over the whole population is controlled 
to capture the potential effect of religion on corruption. The data are taken from the 
Religious Characteristics of States Dataset Project (RCS-Dem 2.0 2017).  
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Methods  
Fixed effects panel regression  
I conduct a panel regression analysis of corruption among a large set of countries. 
The unit of observation is the country-year. In order to address the repeated observations 
of the countries over time, two common approaches are used: fixed effects models (FEM) 
and random effects models (REM). Compared to FEM, the REM is more efficient, but 
one limitation is it yields biased coefficients if there is a correlation between the unit-
specific error term and the covariates (Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2010). To test whether 
such correlation exists, I conduct Hausman tests and it suggests that such correlation is 
present in these data, thus I choose fixed effects models. Due to missing data on the 
dependent and independent variables, the panel dataset is unbalanced.  
One strength of this model is that it allows me to control for omitted time-
invariant unobservable covariates that vary across countries. Thus, the inclusion of fixed 
country effects in the models provide correct estimation accounting for this source of 
omitted-variable bias. Panel data often leads to heteroskedastic and serially corrected 
error terms, which will bias standard errors if left unaddressed (Wooldridge 2010). Using 
the available identification test in Stata 15.0, I tested and rejected the null hypotheses of 
homoscedasticity and zero serial correlation (Wooldridge 2010). To address serially 
correlated errors, I employ a first-order (AR1) auto-correlation with a Prais-Winsten 
transformation. To correct for heteroskedasticity and spatially correlated errors, I employ 
the panel-corrected standard errors (PSCE) of Beck and Katz (1995).  
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Mediation analysis  
Because the hypotheses aim to investigate the mediation effect, I need a test of the 
null hypothesis that there is no indirect effect of women’s political representation on 
corruption which works through increasing social spending. Thus, I employ the three-step 
multiple regression approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) combined with the Sobel test 
(Sobel 1982) to estimate mediation and indirect effects. This approach is widely adopted 
by former studies and shown to be effective (e.g. Mahutga 2016). Baron and Kenny 
(1986) noted that three conditions must be satisfied to establish mediation: first, the 
independent variables should be significantly related to the mediator variable; second, the 
independent variable should have an effect on the dependent variable and third, the 
mediator should influence the dependent variable. Thus, it is expected that if the 
mediating or indirect effect exists, the influence of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable should decrease once the mediator is introduced. I estimate different 
regressions following the steps illustrated by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, the 
attenuation of the coefficients of the independent variable cannot provide definite 
evidence for the mediating effect because the correlation between the independent 
variable and the mediator can bias the estimated results.  Thus, I conduct the Sobel test to 
test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the indirect path from women’s political 
representation through social spending is equal to zero, which enables me to test whether 
the absolute size of the mediating effect is meaningful. The Sobel test is equal to S = 
𝑎∗𝑏
√𝑏2𝑆𝑎
2+𝑎2𝑆𝑏
2
 , where a denotes the path from women’s political representation to social 
spending, b denotes the effect of social spending on corruption, Sa and Sb denote the 
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standard error for a and b separately, and 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 is denoted as the indirect effect (Sobel 
1982). Employing Sobel test in this way, I assume the direction of causal effect is from 
social spending to corruption. However, the reverse causality is also possible. Thus, I use 
instrumental variables and two-stage least squares regression to address the potential 
endogeneity issue in the robustness test session.  
V. Results  
Models 1 through 4 in table 2 report results which address hypothesis one, that 
women’s political representation has both a direct and indirect effect on corruption 
through increasing government’s health spending. Model 1 regresses the perception of 
corruption (CPI) on women’s political representation and other control variables. It 
shows that women’s political representation has a negative and significant effect on 
corruption (CPI). This result is consistent with much previous work (e.g. Dollar, Fisman, 
and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; Esarey and Leslie 2018) and is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the mediation hypothesis. Model 2 excludes women’s political 
representation and introduces government’s expenditure on health. The significant effect 
of government’s health spending is also a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
mediation hypothesis. Model 3 introduces both government’s health spending and 
women’s political representation into the same equation. The coefficient on women’s 
political representation in model 3 is 10.4 percent smaller than in model 1, which is 
consistent with my hypothesis. The shrinking effect of women’s political representation 
is also a necessary, but insufficient, condition for mediation. To evaluate the fourth 
condition, I regress government health spending on women’s political representation and 
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the other controls in model 4. Then I conduct the Sobel test using the coefficients and 
standard errors in table 2. Th product ab is -0.0075 and the standard error of the product 
is 0.003 (p<0.05). Thus, consistent with hypothesis 1, there is a significant indirect effect 
of women’s political representation that works through increases in the government’s 
expenditure on health (-0.0075/0.003, p<0.05).  
[Table 2 about here] 
Models 1 through 4 in table 3 test whether there is an indirect effect of women’s 
political representation on corruption through increasing government’s expenditure on 
education. Conducting the same procedures, model 1 indicates that women’s political 
representation has a significant negative effect on corruption. Model 2 excludes women’s 
political representation and introduces government’s education spending. The result 
shows that government’s education spending has a significant negative effect on 
corruption only at the 0.1 level. Then, model 3 includes both women’s political 
representation and government’s education spending into the same equation. Contrary to 
hypothesis 2, education spending loses statistical significance. Thus, even though model 
4 indicates that women’s political representation has a positive effect on government’s 
expenditure on education, there is insufficient evidence for mediation. Thus, hypothesis 2 
does not gain empirical support. Although increases in women’s political representation 
lead to more government spending on education, this does not result in a lower corruption 
level than expected. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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VI. Robustness tests   
Endogeneity of health spending  
In testing the hypothesis that government’s expenditure on health mediates the 
relationship between women’s political representation and corruption via the Sobel test, I 
assume that government’s health spending is an exogenous predictor of corruption and 
the causal arrows runs in one direction, from government’s health spending to corruption. 
However, some literature suggests that the casual arrow runs from corruption to 
government’s health spending (e.g. Ondřej and Drobiszová 2015; Delavallade 2006). 
Thus, to access the validity of this assumption, I test the null hypothesis that 
government’s health spending is exogenous in the model of corruption.  
To test this hypothesis, I employ a two-stage least squares regress (2sls). In the 
first stage, I regress government’s health spending on two excluded instruments –the 
percentage of population ages 65 and above, and the percentage of the population ages 0 
to 14--along with the rest of the covariates in model 4 of table 1. These data are obtained 
from World Bank (2018). In the second stage, the potentially endogenous variable is 
replaced with the predicted values from the first-stage regression. In order to acquire 
unbiased coefficients of the second stage regression, the instrument variables should 
correlate with government health spending but not with corruption. More specifically, 
two conditions should be held: (1) the instruments are not weak, i.e. instruments are 
strongly correlated with the potential exogeneous variable and (2) the instruments are 
valid, i.e. instruments are exogeneous in the second stage regression (Wooldridge 2010).  
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Thus, it is clear that the utility of the IV regression is determined by the strength 
and validity of the instruments. Previous literature finds that population demographics 
have an influence on countries’ health expenditures (e.g. Tchoe and Nam 2010; Getzen 
1992). Moreover, these instruments are likely valid since there is little reason to expect 
that population demographics impact corruption except through their impact on social 
spending. 
 In addition to theoretical reasons, I use diagnostic tests in Stata. The first is the 
weak identification test. The null hypothesis is the excluded instruments are only weakly 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. If instruments are weak, then 2SLS provides 
no protection against endogeneity bias. There are two statistics for this test. One is the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the other is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. The 
former is no longer valid if the i.i.d. assumption is violated. Since the structure of the 
panel data requires to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and the i.i.d 
assumption is not valid in the presence of the robust options, a correspondingly-robust 
Klibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007). The 
second is the Sargan-Hansen test which tests for overidentifying restrictions. The null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, which means they can be excluded from the 
second-stage regression (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007: 481-483). Thus, if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, then it shows the instruments are valid. Finally, I conduct a test 
for endogeneity. The null hypothesis is that the variable is exogenous (Baum, Schaffer 
and Stillman 2007:482-483). Thus, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the regressor is 
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endogenous in the second-stage regression and the coefficients in Table 2 and 3 are 
biased.  
The results of this analysis are reported in the model 2 and model 3 of table 4. 
Since the panel-corrected standard errors (PSCE) of Beck and Katz (1995) is not 
available for IV regression, I employ the cluster robust option to control for the 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-panel autocorrelation (Cameron, Gelbach and 
Miller 2006). The results of the first test shows that the remaining bias in my parameter 
estimates is no more than 15% of that in Tables 2 and 3.  The second test shows that I fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments (i.e. the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the second stage error term. These results are reported in rows 16 and 
17 in table 4. Thus, I conclude these instruments are both strong and valid.4 Also, the null 
hypothesis that health spending is exogenous is rejected (i.e. health spending is correlated 
with the second-stage error term). Thus, health spending is endogenous and the 
coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 are biased (see rows 18 in table 4).  
Because the above results of tests of instruments show that the previous mediation 
analysis is biased by endogeneity, I replicate all mediation analysis but replace the 
coefficient on health spending with the 2sls result. Model 1 of table 4 shows that 
women’s political representation is negatively associated with corruption level at 0.05 
level. Model 2 reports the 2SLS regression of corruption on instrumented health spending 
                                                 
4 Since the instruments are valid but are less strong (the instruments are weak is not rejected 
at 10% level of bias), I also employ the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
as the estimators since it can give less biased estimates compared to 2sls ((Baum, Schaffer 
and Stillman 2010: 456-506). The results are substantively similar.  
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and controls. Not only does health spending have a negative effect on corruption, but the 
ratio of this coefficient to its standard error increases relative to model 2 of Table 2 
(p<0.01). Model 3 of table 4 introduces both women’s political representation and health 
spending in the same 2SLS framework. Here, the coefficient on women’s political 
representation declines in size by ~61% and is no longer significant. Health spending is 
significant at 0.01 level. Model 4 of table 4 tests the relationship between women’s 
political representation and government health spending using the same VCE as in 
models 2 and 3. The results show that one percentage increase of women in lower or 
single chambers of the parliament lead to a 0.022 unit increase of government health 
spending.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Finally, I conduct Sobel test using the results from table 4. The results show that 
the product ab is -0.066 and the standard error of the product is 0.031 (p<0.05). Thus, 
after adjusting coefficients for the presence of endogeneity, hypothesis 1 still receives 
empirical support. That is, there remains a significant indirect effect of women’s political 
representation that works through increases in the government’s expenditure on health (-
0.066/0.031, p<0.05).  
Alternative explanation  
Some studies find that women’s labor participation has a suppressing effect on a 
country’s level of corruption (e.g. Swamy et al. 2001). In the present analysis, it is 
possible that the observed effect of female legislators is driven by political demands of 
women in the labor force (Neudorfer 2016). In other words, the gender of legislators is 
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not relevant because when the political demands from working women are large, both 
female legislators and male legislators should respond to these demands to gain more 
political support. To test this alternative hypothesis, I control for female labor 
participation in model 3 of table 4 and replicate other models in table 4 with the 
introduction of female labor participation. If the alternative explanation is true, then the 
direct and indirect effect of women’s political representation on corruption should not 
exist after controlling women’s labor participation. The data on the latter is measured as 
the percentage of female workers in the total labor force and is drawn from World Bank 
(2018).  
The results are presented in table 5. Because of the missing values on female 
labor participation and two singletons, in total 12 observations are dropped. Model 1 of 
table 5 shows that women’s labor participation is not significantly related to the country’s 
corruption level. Thus, the first condition of mediation effect of labor participation is not 
satisfied. Model 2 shows that health spending is negatively related to corruption level at 
0.01 level after controlling for female labor participation but excludes women’s political 
representation. Model 3 shows that both women’s political representation and labor 
participation are not significant associated with corruption level while health spending is 
still negatively associated with country’s level of corruption. Model 4 shows that 
women’s political representation is positively related to government health spending 
while the number of female workers has no effect. Lastly, I conduct the Sobel test using 
results from table 5. The indirect effect ab is -0.072 and the standard error of the product 
is 0.035 (p<0.05). Thus, after controlling for female labor participation, hypothesis 1 still 
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get empirical support, indicating that women’s political representation rather than 
women’s labor participation has an indirect effect on corruption which works through 
increases in government’s expenditure on health (-0.072/0.035, p<0.05).  
[Table 5 about here] 
In addition to women’s labor participation, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) 
find that women’s representation has the strongest effect when officials can be held 
electorally accountable in democratic and semi-democratic countries. That is, the 
electoral accountability moderates the link between women’s representation and 
corruption. They suggest that women’s risk aversion characteristic explains this 
conditional effect since the risks of engaging in corruption are higher when electoral 
accountability is strong. To examine this moderating effect, I first introduce an 
interaction term between women’s representation in parliament and accountability, 
without controlling for health spending. The data on the on accountability is gained from 
World Bank (2018). It is an index which captures the extent to which citizens of a 
country can participate in the selection of governments, as well as the independence of 
media (Kaufmann et al. 2011). The results are consistent with Esarey and Schwindt-
Bayer (2017). The interaction between women’s political representation and political 
accountability is significantly negatively associated with corruption (p<0.05), indicating 
that women’s political representation has a stronger suppressing effect on corruption 
when political accountability is strong. Then, I add health spending into this model. 
However, after controlling for health spending, the interaction between women’s 
representation and political accountability is no longer significant. Last, I use the above 
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2sls regression which addresses the endogeneity of health spending. The interaction 
between women’s political representation and political accountability remains non-
significant. Thus, the findings suggest that women’s political power, instead of risk 
aversion, explains the association between women’s presence in parliaments and 
corruption.  
Substantive Significance  
Consistent with previous studies, my results show that women’s political 
representation has a significant negative effect on corruption. Controlling for other 
variables and the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the country level in the 
model, with the lowest OLS coefficient, a one standard-deviation (10.86%) increase in 
women’s political representation is associated with a reduction in the expected corruption 
perception by 0.61points (p<0.05; Model 1,Table 3). With the highest (IV) coefficient, a 
one standard-deviation (10.86%) increase in women’s share in parliament is associated 
with an improvement in the expected corruption perception by 1.20 (p<0.05; Model 1, 
Table 4). 
Further, the results show that the negative effect of women’s political 
representation on corruption works through the expansion of government health 
spending. How substantively important is the indirect effect for reducing corruption? To 
answer this question, I calculate the size of the indirect effect. Before correcting for the 
endogeneity between health spending and corruption, nearly 10.39% of the (ceteris 
paribus) suppressing effect of women’s political representation on corruption is mediated 
by the government health spending. After the endogeneity is addressed, the indirect effect 
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of women’s political representation on corruption which works through government 
health spending increase to 60.66%, suggesting that nearly 60 % of the effect of women’s 
political representation on corruption is mediated by government health spending. Thus, 
the indirect effect of women’s political representation which works through government 
health spending is not only statistically significant but also sizable.  
VII. Discussion and conclusion  
In investigating the association between women’s political representation and 
corruption, I first examine whether the relationship between women’s presence in 
parliaments and corruption is spurious. By employing fixed effects panel regression on 
data for up to 162 countries from 2000 to 2015, I find that after accounting for time-
invariant country-specific characteristics, higher share of females in politics is 
significantly associated with a reduction of corruption in that country. This conclusion is 
consistent with the previous studies which find female legislators lead to a lower level of 
corruption (Jha and Sarangi 2018; Watson and Moreland 2014; Treisman 2007).  
Next, I ask why the relationship between women’s political representation and 
corruption exists. Current studies develop two causal mechanisms to explain the 
relationship. The first is the gender difference approach which regards the essentialized 
gendered characteristics such as risk aversion as the driver of different corruption-
engaged behavior. The inherent logic is that women, who are more risk averse than men, 
engage in corruption less to avoid the risk of being caught (Swamy et al. 2001; Esarey 
and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). The second is the women’s interest 
approach which argues that female politicians’ policy preferences to protect women’s 
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interests lead to less corruption. More specifically, since female’s politicians’ support for 
policies which improve women’s interests is especially dependent on a well-functioning 
state which is free of corruption, women have more incentives to actively inhibit 
corruption (Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Bauher et al. 2018; Jha and Sarangi 2018). I 
argue that compared to the risk aversion explanation, women’s interest mechanism is 
more convincing since female politicians as elite women may not be more risk averse 
than male politicians (Djerf-Pierre and Wängnerud 2015), anti-corruption efforts also 
involve risks (Bauher et al. 2018). Also, the essentialized risk aversion overlooks 
women’s conscience political agency and female legislators’ broader effects in society 
which may help reduce corruption. Along with the women’s interest mechanism, I argue 
that female legislators’ policy preference on increase social spending leads to less 
corruption because the expansion of social spending decreases the need for corrupted 
transactions, offers incentives for women in large society to combat corruption and 
monitor government, and reduces the percentage of government private spending which 
is more prone to corruption.  
To test the causal mechanism, I conduct mediation analysis using government 
health spending and education spending as mediators. My results from mediation analysis 
provide evidence for the women’s interest mechanism and suggests that risk aversion, at 
most, can only partially explain female politicians’ suppressing effect on corruption. 
First, I use the Sobel test to examine the indirect effect of women’s political 
representation on corruption which works through government health spending and find 
the indirect effect is both statistically and substantively significant. That is, government 
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health spending mediates the association between women’s political representation and 
corruption. Second, the indirect effect is robust after I address the endogeneity between 
the government health spending and corruption. Women’s political representation loses 
statistical significance after government health spending is introduced. Further, the 
indirect effect increases from 10.39% to 60.66%. Thus, nearly 60% of the (ceteris 
paribus) suppressing effect of women’s political representation on corruption is explained 
by the government health spending. However, contrary to expectation, I do not find 
sufficient evidence for the mediating effect of government education spending. One 
possible explanation is that corruptions are more pervasive in the health sector than in the 
education sector (e.g. Bauher et al. 2018) which makes the effect of women’s policy on 
expansion of heath spending more prominent. Another potential explanation is that the 
endogeneity between government education spending and corruption biases the result. 
Since addressing endogeneity requires the available instruments and such instruments are 
hard to find, whether government education spending mediates the effect of women’s 
political representation on corruption is needed to be examined by future studies. 
Nevertheless, my results show that female legislators’ policy preference to more social 
spending help reduce corruption, which supports the women’s interests mechanism.  
Moreover, I examine whether the reduced level of corruption is brought by 
women’s labor participation rather than women’s political participation. First, I test if 
women’s labor participation has a direct negative effect on corruption. Based on risk 
aversion mechanism, women’s labor participation should help inhibit corruption since 
working women are more risk averse than working men thus engage in corruption less. 
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However, I do not find evidence for this prediction. Controlling for time-invariant 
country-specific heterogeneities, women’s labor participation is not significantly 
associated with corruption. This result is consistent with some previous findings (e.g. Jha 
and Sarangi 2018). Second, I test the alternative explanation that working women’s 
demand leads to more social spending thus reduce corruption. If this explanation was 
true, then the indirect effect of women’s political representation would have lost 
significance after controlling for women’s labor participation. I do not find evidence for 
this alternative explanation either. The rationale is that even though working women 
demand more public goods, the fulfillment of their demand is largely dependent on 
whether their demand can be channeled through institutions, i.e. legislators’ response to 
these demands. Since female legislators are more responsive to women’s interests, they 
can shape policies leading to increased social spending more directly than working 
women. Last, I find that the interaction between women’s political representation and 
political accountability is no longer significant after controlling for health spending, 
which suggests that female legislators’ political power instead of their risk aversion 
characteristic help explain the gender-corruption relationship.  
One limitation of this study is that corruption is measured as perception of 
corruption instead of the actual corruption. Therefore, the direct interpretation of my 
results is that a greater presence of women in parliaments reduces the perception of 
corruption through expanding social spending, although corruption perception has been 
found to be highly correlated with actual corruption. Despite this fact, my results provide 
useful insights. It helps disentangle the two casual mechanisms, that is the risk aversion 
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mechanism and the women’s interest mechanism. My results show that it is female 
legislators’ political power rather than the gendered essentialized risk aversion 
characteristic contributes to anti-corruption. This suggests that promoting women’s 
political representation can help combat corruption. Increasing the share of women in 
politics has become an important goal for government policies and international 
organizations such as the UN (United Nations 2015). My research shows the beneficial 
effects of women’s political representation on better governance quality, thus provides 
evidence for increasing females’ participation in politics.  
Despite the efforts made to improve women’s political representation, women’s 
pollical participation remains low. Based on my results, the total effect of women’s 
political representation on corruption is not so sizable even if larger presence of women 
in parliaments do contribute to reducing corruption. One possible explanation is that the 
results suggest that women’s political power is still weak. First, the numeric 
representation of women is still low in the national parliaments. Based on my sample, the 
average percentage of females in single or lower chamber of parliaments is only 17.19%. 
In the classical thesis of Kanter (1993), she illustrates the significance of proportions and 
how the numerical distributions matter for behavior in organizations. She argues that in 
skewed groups where men far outnumbered women, women are “tokens” who have low 
opportunity and low power, facing performance pressures, confrontation of the dominant 
groups and the role encapsulation of the gendered stereotype (Kanter 1993). In current 
national parliaments where women only occupy a small percentage of the total 
legislators, these female legislators are in the “token” situation, facing with the 
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disadvantages of the numeric underrepresentation. Thus, more policies aim to increase 
women’s presence in politics such as affirmative actions are needed. Moreover, 
incorporating more women in parliaments is just the first step. Despite women’s numeric 
underrepresentation in the politics, female politicians also are excluded from the “old 
boys’ network” and face with discrimination and sexism (Galligan and Clavero 2008). 
Within such political environment, it is difficult for female politicians to achieve their 
political goals. Thus, instead of relying on women’ naturalized or socialized essentialized 
characteristics such as risk aversion to reduce corruption, more efforts should be paid to 
create a more women-friendly institutional or organizational environment in order to 
strengthen female legislators’ political power to achieve their policy agendas.  
My analyses also raise two questions for future research. First, what are the 
specific mechanisms linking women’s political power to reduced corruption? I suggest 
that there are two possible specific mechanisms. First, the expansion of social spending 
will decrease the need for engaging in corruption. Second, since women rely more on 
social spending to provide everyday services than men, more social spending offers 
women in large society more incentives to protect the governments from corruption. 
Future studies can examine which mechanism (s) contributes to anti-corruption. Second, 
what are other potential explanations for the suppressing effect of women’s political 
representation on corruption? My results suggest that female politicians’ political power, 
i.e. the expansion of social spending, explains nearly 60% of the total effect. However, 
40% percent of the total effect remains unexplained. In addition to risk aversion, 
Alexander (2018) argues that the gender equality socializes norms of impartiality which 
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support a culture of anti-corruption. She finds that people with stronger gender egalitarian 
values attribute higher importance to honest elections without corruption and this 
relationship is stronger in more gender egalitarian countries (Alexander 2018). Thus, 
future research can examine whether females’ presence in national parliaments contribute 
to a more gender egalitarian value, which helps reduce corruption.  
To conclude, my results show that women’s participation in politics should be 
encouraged not only in order to achieve gender equality but also because it has positive 
externalities, that is a negative impact on corruption. Moreover, instead of relying on the 
essentialized risk aversion and only increase female politicians’ number to combat 
corruption, more policies should be introduced to create a more gender equal 
environment for female politicians to achieve their policy agenda.  
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TABLE 1.. Unstandardized Coefficients of Government’s Health Spending and 
Corruption (CPI) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CPI CPI CPI Health Spending 
     
WIP -0.077***  -0.069*** 0.022*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022) (0.003) 
Health spending  -0.409*** -0.340***  
  (0.128) (0.130)  
GDP per capita5 -0.060** -0.077*** -0.048 0.036*** 
 (0.003)6 (0.029) (0.030) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) 
FDI -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Democracy 0.137 0.117 0.133 -0.009 
 (0.202) (0.201) (0.201) (0.028) 
Protestants (%) -0.570*** -0.648*** -0.589*** -0.055*** 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.080) (0.012) 
Rule of Law -3.622*** -3.605*** -3.688*** -0.214* 
 (0.806) (0.807) (0.805) (0.111) 
Regulations  -3.671*** -3.573*** -3.642*** 0.061 
 (0.660) (0.661) (0.658) (0.090) 
Accountability  -1.368* -1.266 -1.248 0.336*** 
 (0.830) (0.830) (0.827) (0.126) 
Constant 77.488*** 75.916*** 77.521*** 0.023 
 (3.056) (3.009) (3.048) (0.260) 
     
Observations 1,968 1,968 1,968 1,968 
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.888 
Number of numeric 162 162 162 162 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes:  
Coefficients are unstandardized and net of fixed country effects; heteroskedasticity- and 
serial correlation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses;  
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
                                                 
 
 
6  For GDP per capita in table 1 to table 4, I multiply both the coefficient and the standard 
deviation by 1000 to better present the results. 
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TABLE 2:Unstandardized Coefficients of Government’s Education Spending and 
Corruption (CPI) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CPI CPI CPI 
Education 
Spending 
     
WIP -0.056**  -0.050* 0.024*** 
 (0.028)  (0.029) (0.006) 
Education spending  -0.314* -0.273  
  (0.177) (0.178)  
GDP per capita -0.098*** -0.120*** -0.097*** 0.003 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) 
FDI -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) 
Democracy 0.274 0.256 0.275 0.003 
 (0.265) (0.264) (0.265) (0.046) 
Protestants (%) -0.558*** -0.584*** -0.553*** 0.018 
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.015) 
Rule of Law -3.440*** -3.371*** -3.477*** -0.164 
 (1.027) (1.024) (1.025) (0.179) 
Regulations  -4.449*** -4.364*** -4.405*** 0.149 
 (0.844) (0.843) (0.843) (0.129) 
Accountability  -1.802* -1.723* -1.726* 0.286 
 (1.043) (1.041) (1.039) (0.189) 
Constant 80.003*** 79.893*** 80.819*** 2.933*** 
 (3.206) (3.163) (3.212) (0.465) 
     
Observations 1,307 1,307 1,307 1,307 
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.843 
Number of numeric 147 147 147 147 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes:  
Coefficients are unstandardized and net of fixed country effects; heteroskedasticity- and 
serial correlation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses;  
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 3: Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable Regression of Health 
Spending on Corruption and Mediation Analysis using the Predicted Value of Health 
Spending in the first stage 
Notes: Arbitrary heteroskedasticity- and arbitrary within-panel autocorrelation-consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Population ages 65 
and above as a percentage of the total population and population between the ages 0 to 14 
as a percentage of the total population are used as instruments for government’s health 
spending.  
a. Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (### < 15% OLS bias).  
b. Hanson J statistic, distributed χ2.  
c. Pseudo C statistic, distributed χ2. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CPI CPI CPI Health Spending 
     
WIP -0.110**  -0.043 0.022*** 
 (0.049)  (0.055) (0.007) 
Health Spending  -3.293*** -2.983***  
  (1.016) (1.063)  
GDP per capita -0.048 0.071 0.075 0.041*** 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.077) (0.012) 
Inflation -0.013 -0.020 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) 
FDI -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) 
Democracy  0.487 0.423 0.434 -0.018 
 (0.370) (0.398) (0.396) (0.047) 
Protestants (%) -
0.589*** 
-0.787*** -0.742*** -0.051* 
 (0.167) (0.192) (0.196) (0.028) 
Rule of Law -
4.836*** 
-5.405*** -5.413*** -0.194 
 (1.578) (1.563) (1.539) (0.185) 
Regulations -
4.957*** 
-4.770*** -4.813*** 0.048 
 (1.479) (1.443) (1.437) (0.165) 
Accountability  -2.926** -1.637 -1.723 0.403** 
 (1.441) (1.557) (1.518) (0.204) 
     
Observations 1,966 1,966 1,966 1,966 
R-squared 0.166 0.008 0.041 0.137 
Number of numeric 160 160 160 160 
Instruments are weaka  16.468### 13.571###  
instruments are validb  0.758 0.576  
Health spending is exogenousc  6.784*** 5.580**  
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TABLE 4: Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable Regression of Health 
Spending on Corruption and Mediation Analysis using the Predicted Value of Health 
Spending in the first stage, controlling for female labor participation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CPI CPI CPI Health Spending 
     
WIP -0.110**  -0.039 0.022*** 
 (0.051)  (0.058) (0.007) 
Female labor participation 0.127 0.208 0.218 0.028 
 (0.210) (0.269) (0.252) (0.030) 
Health Spending  -3.490*** -3.219***  
  (1.114) (1.174)  
GDP per capita -0.055 0.067 0.070 0.039*** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.013) 
Inflation -0.011 -0.019 -0.020 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) 
FDI -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) 
Democracy  0.495 0.435 0.443 -0.016 
 (0.376) (0.413) (0.411) (0.047) 
Protestants (%) -
0.599*** 
-0.812*** -0.774*** -0.054** 
 (0.169) (0.196) (0.204) (0.028) 
Rule of Law -
4.695*** 
-5.269*** -5.262*** -0.176 
 (1.583) (1.586) (1.563) (0.189) 
Regulations -
4.964*** 
-4.728*** -4.782*** 0.057 
 (1.519) (1.483) (1.483) (0.168) 
Accountability  -3.031** -1.724 -1.791 0.385* 
 (1.446) (1.581) (1.546) (0.203) 
     
Observations 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 
R-squared 0.164 -0.012 0.019 0.139 
Number of numeric 159 159 159 159 
Instruments are weaka  15.073### 12.438###  
instruments are validb  0.591 0.446  
Health spending is exogenousc  6.880*** 5.820**  
Notes: Arbitrary heteroskedasticity- and arbitrary within-panel autocorrelation-consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses -consistent standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Population ages 65 and above as a percentage of the total 
population and population between the ages 0 to 14 as a percentage of the total 
population are used as instruments for government’s health spending.  
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a. Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (### < 15% OLS bias).  
b. Hanson J statistic, distributed χ2.  
c. Pseudo C statistic, distributed χ2. 
 
 
